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ABSTRACT
I show that the "indivisible labor" models of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986), Hansen
(1985), Rogerson (1988), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and many others are, when aggregated
across persons with the same marginal utility of income, equivalent to the divisible labor model of
Lucas and Rapping (1969); any data on aggregate hours and earnings generated by the divisible
(indivisible) model can be generated by some parameterization of the indivisible (divisible) model.
The same is true when "macro" data is obtained by aggregating over time and across people. This
equivalence means that the indivisibility of labor per se does not have implications for
macroeconomics. Nor does indivisibility have "aggregate" normative implications.
I then build a micro model of the bunching of work in continuous time as the consequence
of fixed costs and "fatigue effects." Only in a special case does the micro model has as its reduced
form the indivisible labor model. In other cases, the bunching of work in time may have unique
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VII. Conclusions 35“A small fall in the price of hats or watches will not affect the action of everyone; but it will induce
a few persons, who were in doubt whether or not to get a new hat or a new watch, to decide in favor
of doing so.  ...But the economist has little concern with particular incidents in the lives of individuals
...the variety and fickleness of individual action are merged in the comparatively regular aggregate
of the action of many.”  Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, III.iii.5.
I.  Introduction
Employment is an important “margin” of labor supply (Coleman 1984, Heckman 1993) and
many have emphasized the micro-econometric implications of discrete choice in the labor market.
But what are the implications of “indivisible labor” for macroeconomic data - measures of economic
activity that are aggregated over time and across people?  Some (eg., Ashenfelter 1980) suggest that
the importance of the employment margin relative to the “hours” margin means that the substitution
of work over time must be unimportant.  Others such as Hansen (1985), Hansen and Sargent (1988),
Rogerson (1988), Plosser (1989), Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), Kydland and Prescott (1991),
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and Cho and Cooley (1994) have argue that the indivisibility of
labor means that there is a lot - even infinite - substitution of work over time.
One definition of “indivisibility” is common in the labor and macroeconomics literatures (eg.,
Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986), Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988), Hamilton (1988), Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992)): work during some time interval must occur for exactly & n units of time or
there be no work at all.  For example, the time interval might be a week with a person working
exactly forty hours during a week or not working at all.  This indivisible environment can be
contrasted with the “divisible” labor environment described by Lucas and Rapping (1969, hereafter
LR) where workers may choose to work any fraction of any time interval.
I argue that the hypothesis that all or even some workers in the economy face such an
indivisibility constraint has no implications for macroeconomics.  In particular, I write down an
economy with indivisible labor - of which Hansen’s (1985) and Rogerson's (1988) economies are
special cases - and show that any macro data generated by the divisible labor economy can be
generated by some parameterization of the indivisible economy.  Conversely, any macro data
generated by the indivisible labor economy can be generated by some parameterization of the divisible
economy.  Hence, the micro-level indivisibility of labor does not by itself justify the constant marginalFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -2
disutility of work assumed by Hansen (1985), Hansen and Sargent (1988), Rogerson (1988), Plosser
(1989), Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), Kydland and Prescott (1991), Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992), Cho and Cooley (1994), and others in the literature.
Although commonly used in the literature, Hansen's and Rogerson's definition of indivisibility
is a special one. I build a micro model of the optimal bunching of labor in continuous time and show
that a special case of the model is equivalent to my indivisible labor model. Thus the optimal
bunching of labor in continuous time need not have macro implications. Nevertheless, this leaves
open the possibility that some other cases of the optimal bunching model do have macro implications.
The optimal bunching of work in time has naturally led to tax rules that are functions of time
aggregated data. I show that the indivisibility or optimal bunching of work together with time
aggregated nonlinear tax rules do have implications for both micro and macro data. This is not a
point made by Hansen (1985) and those in the literature who have followed, but the interactions
between indivisibility and government policy may generate quite interesting implications. I propose
that one of them is that labor supply is relatively unresponsive to tax rates.
II. Macro Implications of Divisible and Indivisible Labor Supply with Linear Consumption
Value Functions
JJ.A. Consumption Side of the Model
Individuals care about their lifetime consumption and its allocation over time. My analysis
uses a "consumption value function" U(c) to summarize this part of a consumer's decision problem:
U(c)max u(c1,c2,...,c)s.t. e''Q,c, c
c/I,=
whereT ￿1and e'°Q, is the period tinterestrate factor.
Implicit in my use of a consumption value function in the analysis of labor supply is the
assumption that consumption and leisure are separable: a different rate of growth of consumption
(leisure) does not mean a different intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of leisure
(consumption). I assume consumption-leisure separability not for realism, but to derive moreFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -3
transparent results and to facilitate comparisons with previous studies of indivisible labor which
typically have assumed separability.
II. B. Lucas and Rapping 's Divisible Representative Agent Model
As a contrast to the indivisible labor model, it is useful to begin by introducing a divisible labor
environment. During a time interval -whoselength I normalize to one -therepresentative individual
may work from anywhere from 0 to n units of time. Time interval t work is paid at wage rate w,.
The present value of lifetime consumption C is financed out of the present value of lifetime earnings
and an initial asset stock a.
For now I assume that the consumption value function is linear: U(C) =XCwhere .isa
constant.' Hence, the problem (P1) describes the representative agent's labor supply decisions when
labor is perfectly divisible:
(P1) Optimal Divisible Labor in Discrete Time
max ?C —e 'g1v(N1),, g,>0
C4N,1
s.t.N1 E[O,hlmax] Ca + eI) 1w, N1
where N is time worked during time period t, p is the rate of time preference, g, is a preference
parameter, a is the consumer's initial asset holdings, W1isthe period £ wage rate, and Qisthe period
t interest rate factor (defined net of the rate of time preference).
Because of the assumed separability over time and the assumed separability of consumption
'I show later that, by introducing employment lotteries and some consumption insurance,
identical results can be derived for any increasing and concave U(C). There it will be shown that
the analytical convenience derives from having no more than infinitesimal changes in U'(C) with
the smallest possible change in any of the decision variables (which is a discrete change in the
indivisible model and an infinitesimal one in the divisible model), not that U'(C) be independent of
prices.Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -4
and leisure, (P1) is a special case of the LR (1969) model.2 Like LR, any amount of time worked in
the interval [O,fljisfeasible in each time interval for a (P1) consumer.
I make two assumptions (A1)-(A2) and one normalization (A3) about the disutility of work





For simplicity, I assume that the function v(IV)doesnot vary over time although the marginal disutility
of work schedule varies over time to the extent that the parameter g, varies.
It will be useful to define a "parameterization" of (P1) to be (a,p,A,n,10,{w,,g,,Q,})
R2XR+3T+2. Wages and interest rates may be determined as part of a general equilibrium (as they are
in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988)), but they are parameters from the point of view of a
consume? s decision problem.
The first order condition for the problem (P1) equates the marginal disutility of work to A
times the discounted wage:
g,v '(N,) =AQ1w, t1,...,T (1)
In this special case that A is a constant, each period's first order condition determines optimal labor
supply for that period.
2LR's empirical specifications implicitly assume something like separability within and
across periods.
3(A3) is a normalization because, if ln v'(N) integrated to some number 0,then same
marginal disutility of work could be represented by redefining the parameter g as ge and
redefining v(JV) as gev(IV).Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -5
II. C. Modeling the Micro-level indivisibility of Labor
In the indivisible model, an individual must either work 0 or 11hoursduring a time interval.
Any amount of work between 0 and 11isnot feasible. Time interval t work is paid at wage rate i4,
sotime interval t earnings are either 0 or w,n. Hence, problem (P2) describes the labor supply
decisions of a consumer whose labor is indivisible:
(P2) Indivisible Labor in Discrete Time
max c - e y,n
c. ,}=
s.t.n E {0, } ,ca + e 1), w1fl,
wheren, is period I time worked and y1 is a preference parameter. My notation distinguishes n,, y,
and c in problem (P2) fromg, and C in problem (P1) because, as shown below, (P1) is assumed
to describe aggregate labor supply while (P2) will be assumed to describe micro-level labor supply.
As in (P 1), w, is the period I wage rate and e''Q, is the period t interest rate factor.
It will be useful to define a "parameterization" of (P2) to be (a, p,)7, {vt,g,,QJ)R2
Wagesand interest rates may be determined as part of a general equilibrium (as they are in Hansen
(1985) and Rogerson (1988)), but they are parameters from the point of view of a consumer's
decision problem.
(P2) describes an environment much like that of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986) or
Hansen (1985) -thereare only two feasible choices for time worked during a particular period:
{0,}. Notice that the marginal disutility of work during time interval I ey1 can, in addition to
a constant rate of discount, vary over time.
It is relevant that (P2) assumes separability of leisure over time but, because of the assumed
indivisibility, not that the disutility of work is linear. To see this, notice that we could start with any
disutility of work function i',(n,), normalize v,(0) =0,define v1(n) =y,n,and have exactly the problem
(P2).
A consumer works or not during time interval t according to:Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -6
n,= as
lID. Aggregation of Problem (P2)
It is useful to aggregate the behavior of heterogeneous individuals solving problems (P2).
(A4) states the assumptions made in the aggregation:
(A4) There are a continuum of individuals solving the problem (P2) (or the problem (P2)' defined
in Section III) who differ only according to their life cycle disutility of work profile F ={Y'12'.•.'YT}
R+T. The geometric mean preference parameter in period t, g,, varies over time but the distribution
F of preferences around that mean is the same every period:
my, —ing,-Fall t
fx dF(x) =0
F is assumed to be once differentiable and strictly increasing on its support [x1,x2]. Let N, denote
average labor supply during time interval t.
Notice that (A4) requires consumers to have the same market value of time i',andsame
interest rate factor Q,ateach date as well as the same rate of time preference p. initial wealth a,
intrasession discount rater, and marginal utility of wealth X. These might be sources of heterogeneity
that are potentially interesting for macroeconomics, but I show that this heterogeneity is not
particularly related to the indivisibility of labor.
The fraction II, of consumers working at date t is F( lnQ,Tv/g,) )4DefineN, to be the date
t average labor supply. IV is computed according to:
4Here I use the assumed continuum of agents to equate probabilities with population





An average budget constraint can easily be computed by averaging the (P2) budget constraint across
consumers:
C =a+ e 1) 1W1 N, (3)
where C is the average present value of lifetime consumption. Notice the similarity of this average
budget constraint with the budget constraint for the divisible problem (P1).
lIE. Divisible and Indivisible Models Generate the Same Macro Data
Proposition 1 When aggregated across individuals according to (A4). macro data on earningsand
hours {IVw} generated by any parameterization of the problem (P2) is identical to the macro data
on earnings and hours {Açw,,N,) generated by some parameterization of the problem (P 1).
Proof (i) Choose any set of parameters (a,p,A,n,{w,,g,,Q,})R2XTR+3T+2for the problem (P2)
(ii) When aggregated according to (A4), average hours {NJ satisfy equation (2).
(iii) Choose the same parameters for the problem (P1) and choose any
disutility of wealth function v(N) that satisfies:
v'(N)
with F' defmed at the end points according to F'(O) =x,and Ft(l) =x2.Notice that any such v(N)
is continuous and satisfies v'(N)>O, v"(IV)>O, and the normalization (A3).
(iv) According to the first order conditions of the problem (P 1), average hours {A1} must satisfy (1)Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -8
which, given the definition of v'(N) above, is the same as (2).
Proposition 2 The macro data {IVw,,N(}generatedby any parameterization of the problem (P1) is
identical to the macro data {1Vw,,IV} obtained by aggregating some parameterization of the problem
(P2) across individuals according to (A4).
Proof (i) Choose any set of parameters (a,p,A,n,{w,,g,,Q,))R2xR3T2for the problem (P1)
(ii) According to the first order conditions of the problem (P1), average hours {N,} must satisfy (1).
(iii) Choose the same parameters (a,p,X,n,{w,,g,,Q,}) for the problem (P2) and choose the
distribution function F according to:
0if x <lnv'(0)
F(x)
(e X)ifx E[lnv '(0). ln v
umax
1if x >inv '(n)
whereis the inverse of v'(N), the marginal disutility of work. Notice that any such F(x) satisfies
FE [0,1], F(x)>0, and the normalization of F displayed in (A4).
(iv) When aggregated according to (A4), average hours {N} from (P2) satisfy equation (2) which,
given the definition of F(x) above, is the same as (1).
II. F. Interpretation
It is noteworthy from the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 that the rate of time preference, the
marginal utility of wealth, the level of initial assets, and the sequences of wages, interest rates, and
tastes, are the same for (P1) and (P2). Propositions 1 and 2 are the key results of this paper, but it
should be noted that a special case of Proposition I was stated by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson
(1988). They showed that their indivisible labor models were equivalent to a special case of the LR
(1969) model -namelythe special case when the marginal disutility of leisure is constant. However,
their assumptions about preferences, assumptions about the homogeneity of consumers, and definition
of equilibrium makes the labor supply side of their models a special case of my problem (P2). WhenFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -9
their assumptions are relaxed to allow for heterogeneity, there still exists an equivalent
parameterization of the LR model, but that equivalent parameterization need not be the linear
parameterization. Proposition 2 shows that there is an equivalent indivisible labor model for any
parameterization of the problem (P1) -includingparameterizations that are not linear and allow for
very little substitution over time.
The proofs of Propositions 1-2 obtain because the marginal utility of lifetime consumption
does not depend on any particular period's labor supply decision. If the marginal utility of lifetime
consumption varied with the level of lifetime consumption, then the smallest possible change in any
particular period's labor supply decision in the problem (P2) is a discrete change and would have a
"wealth effect" in the sense that it would affect the marginal utility of wealth U' whereas my proofs
rely on the constancy of U'. However, to the extent that e'w,isa small fraction of lifetime wealth -
perhapsbecause period tissufficiently far into the future or the length of a "period" is short -orthat
U' is small in magnitude, we can to a good approximation neglect this wealth effect and enjoy
Propositions 1-2 as good approximations.5 However, rather than proving this claim I introduce trade
in lotteries and show that an exact equivalence obtains between the "optimal bunching," "indivisible
labor," and "divisible labor" economies even when the consumption value function is nonlinear.
III. Macro Implications of Divisible and Indivisible Labor Supply with Employment Lotteries
and Nonlinear Consumption Value Functions
lILA. Representative Agent's Divisible Labor
The problem (P1)' is a separable version of the LR model, including the nonlinear
consumption value function:
(P1)' Optimal Divisible Labor in Discrete Time
5The approximation is likely to be poor in Rogerson's (1988) model because he has only
one period.Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -10
max U(C) -etl)g,v(N)
t=1
s.t. N1 e [Oh1,nax], C=a+eP(1Qw!V
(A5) U(C)> 0, U'(C) 0
In addition to (A5), I continue to make the two assumptions (Al)-(A2) and the normalization (A3).
It will be useful to define a "parameterization" of(P1)' to be (a,p,n,,,1,{w,,g,,Q,}) ER2xR31'.
III.B. Micro-level Indivisible Labor, Employment Lotteries
In the indivisible labor problem (P2), workers choose which periods to work. Consider
instead the problem (P2)' where consumers choose a sequence of lotteries {L,} offered by employers.
The date t lottery is: (1) an allowance ,and(2) a probability of working rc,. Consumers receive their
allowance at the beginning of the period regardless of the outcome of the lottery. The firm has
property rights over the labor output w produced by each consumer chosen by the lottery to work.
The market for lotteries is competitive, so the only lotteries that will be traded are those satisfying:
(A),=
(P2)'Indivisible Labor in Discrete Time
max U(c) —ti
s.t.,E [0,1],c=a+P(F)+ e(i-l)Q ,
Itwill be useful to define a "parameterization" of (P2)' to be (a, p,, {w,,g,, Q,}) x +
III.C. Aggregation of Problem (P2)'
it is useful to aggregate the behavior of heterogeneous individuals solving problem (P2)'. In
addition to (A4), I make the assumption (A6) in the aggregation:Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -11
(A6) Before their lifetime preference profiles F ={y,y2,...,yT}are revealed at date 0, (P2)'
consumers choose an insurance contract P(T') that has expected value zero and maximizes the
expected value of the problem (P2)'. Ex ante, each consumer has the same probability of drawing any
particular preference profile.
There will be heterogeneity of tastes in an economy generated by aggregating (P2) or (P2)'
according to (A4). Some consumers are "unlucky" enough to hate work in those periods when it is
most profitable, luck which affects the marginal utility of wealth U(C) in the problem (P2)'. The
insurance contracts specified by (A6) compensate unlucky consumers (and penalize lucky consumers)
in just the right amounts to guarantee the solutions to (P2)' have the same marginal utility of wealth
regardless of F.
In this model, consumer i's date t choice of employment lottery is determined according to:
=0if y >AQ,w1
Jt E (0,1)if y =AQ,w,
=1if y <AQ,w1
Because of the date zero trade in insurance contracts, the marginal utility of wealth A does not vary
across consumers and is therefore not indexed by i. In the three cases listed above, two of them are
the "trivial" lotteries itO and rt=1. Nontrivial lotteries occur only when y, =AQ1w, which-giventhe
continuity of F and the equality of AQ,w across consumers -isa measure zero event.
It is convenient to define the date t "reservation wage" to be the lowest wage at which a
consumer is willing to work with positive probability at date t. The date t reservation wage is y1/AQ,
and work occurs with positive probability at date t wheneverexceedsthe reservation wage.
The fraction ll of consumers working at date t is F( ln(AQ,w/g1)). Define A' to be the date
t average labor supply. A is computed according to equation (2), which I repeat below for the




Since the average insurance premium or award paid at date zero must be zero, an average budget
constraint can easily be computed by averaging the (P2)' budget constraint across consumers:
C= a + eP(tQwN (3)
Theaverage budget constraint (3), the equations (2), and the equation X =U(C)determine average
labor supply at each date.
It is worth noting that oniy the trivial lotteries it=O and it=1 are demanded in the competitive
equilibrium. This is because of (a) the heterogeneity of consumers and (b) the date zero trade in
consumption insurance. That the date zero trade in consumption insurance eliminates the demand
for nontrivial lotteries (7EE(O,1)) in later periods is shown by Cole and Prescott (1997). But even if
consumption insurance were not available, the heterogeneity in tastes for work means there would
typically be only some agents who demand nontrivial lotteries. Furthermore, with enough periods
in the model, allocations obtained with nontrivial lotteries could be well approximated in a model
without them with alternation over time between employment and nonemployment (Romer 1986).
Thus the observation that employment lotteries are rarely (or never) used in the "real world" does not
necessarily undermine the empirical relevance of the model.
Despite their lack of equilibrium use, I include the nontrivial lotteries for two reasons. First,
the standard analysis can be applied because choice sets are convex. Second and more important,
Hansen's and Rogerson's models are literally special cases of my (P2)'.
III.D. Divisible and Indivisible Models Generate the Same Macro Data
Proposition 3 When aggregated across individuals according to (A4) and (A6), macro data on
earnings arid hours {Aw,N(} for any parameterization of the problem (P2)' is identical to the macroFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -13
data {N,w,,N,}generatedby some parameterization of the problem (P 1)'.
Proof (i) Choose any set of parameters (a,p,n,{w,,g,,Q1}) J2xR31forthe problem (P2)'
(ii) When aggregated according to (A4) and (A6), average hours {N} satisfy (2) and (3), and A =
U(C)
(iii)Choose the same parameters (a,p,n,,,,{w,,g1, QJ)forthe problem (P1)' and choose any disutility
of wealth function v(N) that satisfies:
v'(AOe
with F' defined at the end points according to F'(O) =x,and P'(l) =x-,.Notice that any such v(IV)
is continuous and satisfies v'(IV)>O, v"(N)>O, and the normalization (A3).
(iv) According to the first order conditions of the problem (P1)', average hours {IVJ must satisfy
equation (1) with A U(C).
(v) By definition of the problem (P 1)', average hours {IVJ satisfy equation (3).
Proposition 4 The macro data {Aw,,IV}generatedby any parameterization of the problem (P1)' is
identical to the macro data {N,w,, A} obtained by aggregating some parameterization of the problem
(P2)' across individuals according to (A4) and (A6).
Proof (i) Choose any set of parameters (a,p,n,,{wj,g,,Q,}) R2xI3' for the problem (P 1)'
(ii) According to the first order conditions of the problem (P1 )', average hours {\} must satisfy
equation (1) with A =U(C').
(iii) By definition of the problem (P 1)', average hours {NJ satisfy equation (3).
(iv) Choose the same parameters (a,p,n,{wgQ,}) for the problem (P2)' and choose the distribution
function F according to:Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -14
0if x <lnv'(O)
F(x) if x E[lflV'(O),lflV'(fl)]
max
Iif x >inv
where 4isthe inverse of v'(N), the marginal disutility of work. Notice that any such F(x) satisfies
FE[0, 1], F(x)>0, and the normalization for F displayed in (A4).
(v) When aggregated according to (A4) and (A6), average hours (NJ from (P2)' satisfy equations
(2), (3), and A =U(C).
III.E,Divisible and Indivisible Models Have the Same Wel/hre Implications
Because there is some heterogeneity in the indivisible model but not in the divisible model,
it is only meaningful to compare aggregate welfare calculations for the two models. Propositions 5
and 6 show there are at least two sensible ways of aggregating welfare in the indivisible model to
produce calculations identical to their divisible counterparts:
Proposition 5 When the problem (P2)' with rate of time preference p, maximum hours ,interest
rate factors {Q,},andaverage preference profile {g,} is aggregated across individuals according to
(A4) and (A6), the average willingness to pay for wage increase at any date t is the same as the
willingness to pay for problem (P1)' with rate of time preference p, maximum hours 11,interestrate
factors {Q,},andpreference profile {g,}.
Proof (i) In current value terms, the willingness to pay for a marginal increase in iisN, in the
divisible model. This follows from Roy's Identity.
(ii) In current value terms, the willingness to pay for a marginal increase in w, (taking his insurance
premium P(F) as given) is t,n for an individual in the indivisible model who purchases a date t
employment lottery offering probability .Thisfollows from Roy's Identity.
(iii) The average willingness to pay in the indivisible model is the average of 't,n, which is IV.
(iv)Propositions 3 and 4 show that both models generate the same average labor supply Nsothe
average willingness to pay is the same.Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -15
Notice that the wage change hypothesized by Proposition 5 is not insured and the willingness
to pay varies across individuals in the indivisible model. Proposition 6 considers the willingness to
pay for insurable wage changes before each individual's preferences are revealed, defining "indirect
utility functions" for each model. V(a,{w,}) denotes the maximized value of the representative agent's
problem (P1)' and V(a, {w,})themaximized value of (P2)' averaged across individuals.
Proposition 6 When the problem (P2)' with rate of time preference p, maximum hours ,interest
rate factors {Q,},andaverage preference profile {g1} is aggregated across individuals according to
(A4) and (A6), each individual's cx ante expected indirect utility V(a,{w,}) has the same derivatives
as the indirect utility V(a,{w,}) for problem (P 1)' with rate of time preference p, maximum hours i,
interest rate factors {Q,},andpreference profile {g,}.
Proof (i) It is straight-forward to show that, for the problem (P1)', aV/aa =U(C)and aV/aw, =
U(C)e'QN,.
(ii) The expected indirect utility for the problem (P2)' is:
=a + e P(11)Q,wtNt) —p(tI)f
exdF(x)
u'( a+ e P(t1)Q w, N1)
(iii) Using the expression above and the definition of IV for the problem (P2)', it is straight-forward
to show 3 V/3a U(C) and 3 V/8w, =U(C)eQ7\.
(iv) Since N is the same function of (a,{w,}) for the two models, higher order derivatives are the
same for Vand J7.
Proposition 6 derives an equivalence between the indirect utility function for (P1)' and an
aggregate indirect utility function defined for (P2)'. Thus Proposition 6 displays another sense in
which the aggregate willingness to pay for an aggregate wage change is the same in the two models.Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -16
III. F. Interpretation
If we construct an economy of individuals solving the problem (P2)' with identical preferences
at each date, we have the deterministic version of Hansen's (1985) model. To see this, notice that
a nontrivial measure of agents may demand nontrivial employment lotteries. Furthermore, because
each agent has the same ex pastepreferenceprofile F, the only equilibrium date zero insurance
contract is P(F) =0.In Hansen's homogeneous special case, there exists a sequence of wages and
interest rates {wsothat, in Hansen's (1985, p. 318) words, 'the elasticity of substitution between
leisure in different periods for the 'representative agent' is infinite." Hansen also shows that
indivisibility is not necessary to deliver this result -alinear version of LR's divisible model also implies
infinite substitutability over time (see also my Propositions 1 and 3). However, my Propositions 2
and 4 show that indivisible labor is not sufficient to deliver infinite or even substantial substitution
over time. This point is important and quite contrary to the spirit of Hansen's and Rogerson's papers
(as well as later papers by Cho, Cooley, Kydland, and Prescott), so I demonstrate it in an example.
Choose any set of parameters Q,})ER2xR+3T for the problem (P2)' and
aggregate solutions across individuals according to (A4) and (A6), taking the distribution function
F(x) =e OO/ withsupport [oo,100ln ii]. Proposition 4 shows that the same macro data can be
generated by the LR model with v'(N) N'°°. This model has practically no scope for substitution
over time: the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1/100.
In a sense, Hansen's and Rogerson's lotteries are a source of preference heterogeneity because
they divide the population into two groups -thosewho work and those who do not. But the
"heterogeneity" is not revealed until afteragentshave made their decisions for the period.6 Hence
Hansen-Rogerson agents must all make the same decisions and, when those decisions are discrete,
aggregate behavior must be discrete. Under this interpretation, my departure from Hansen and
Rogerson is that heterogeneity is revealed before decisions are made and, as a result, agents make
different decisions which are continuous in the aggregate even when discrete at the micro level.
My allowance for heterogeneous reservation wages is also of substantial empirical relevance.
Rather than describing aggregate fluctuations as infinitesimal movements along a perfectly elastic
labor supply curve (as Hansen does), I allow fluctuations to be discrete movements along an
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imperfectly elastic one. My agents almost surely strictly prefer their chosen labor force status to the
alternative. And it takes a larger wage change to alter the decision of a person whose reservation
wage is further from the equilibrium wage. While Hansen (1985) cannot name who will work as a
function of the equilibrium wage, I predict that the elderly, children, married mothers of young
children, and others with date Ireservationwages higher than their "normal" date tmarketwage will
not work unless the date Imarketwage is substantially higher than what is "normal" for them.
Indeed, the elderly, children, and (although much less so in recent years) married mothers of young
children typically do not work except in extreme circumstances such as wartime (Mulligan 1 998b).
As for Propositions 1-2, the proofs of Propositions 3-4 obtain because the marginal utility of
lifetime consumption does not depend on any particular period's labor supply decision. The constancy
of X is obtained in the former case by assuming a linear lifetime utility function and in the latter case
with some date zero insurance contracts and employment lotteries. These contracts look like "paid
sick leave" or perfect disability insurance since they compensate individuals unlucky enough to dislike
work in periods when it is most productive. If the date zero insurance were not as perfect as modeled
in the problem (P2)', then the smallest possible change in any particular period's labor supply decision
in the problems (P2) and (P2)' is a discrete change and would have a "wealth effect" in the sense that
it would affect the marginal utility of wealth U whereas my proofs rely on the constancy of U.
However, to the extent that isa small fraction of lifetime wealth (perhaps because period Iis
sufficiently far into the future or the length of a "period" is short), that available insurance is nearly
perfect, or that U' is small in magnitude, we can to a good approximation neglect this wealth effect
and enjoy Propositions 3-4 as good approximations.
Notice that, in my aggregation of Problems (P2) and (P2)', I assume nothing about the serial
correlation of an individual's marginal disutility of work y. It is assumed that the distribution of y
across persons is the same every period (up to an aggregate shifter of the geometric mean g,), but this
could result from each individual's drawing a single deviation from the population mean for his entire
lifetime, from many independent draws for each individual, or draws that are imperfectly serially
correlated over time for each individual. The single aggregate interpretation suggested by
Propositions 1-4 of each of these possibilities means that Mincer's (1962) use of a divisible model to
interpret his empirical studies of employment rates is consistent with a more general class of life cycle
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Porath's (1973) claim that the serial correlation of tastes is crucial and with Heckman's (1978) claims
that the "interiority" of solutions is crucial. Formally, the difference between my result, Ben-Poraths,
and Heckman's, is that Ben-Porath and Heckman do not allow for "tastes insurance," employment
lotteries, or a constant marginal utility of wealth A. And, as discussed above,7 it is a quantitative
question whether or not the model with tastes insurance and employment lotteries or the model with
a constant A closely approximates a model without insurance, without lotteries, and a A that
diminishes with lifetime wealth. For example, more serial correlation of tastes means that more
wealth is transferred across agents by my tastes insurance and, with A diminishing rapidly enough,
more heterogeneity of A across agents in the model without tastes insurance.
The reader may guess that my assumed continuity and monotonicity of F and v' are not
necessary to obtain a macro equivalence between the divisible and indivisible economies. v' might
be discontinuous if F' were allowed to be zero, and vice versa. v' might be constant over some range
if F' were allowed to have mass points, and vice versa. I leave a proof of these conjectures to the
reader.
IV. Indivisible Labor as Optimal Bunching in Continuous Time
IVA. Optimal Bunching as a Dynamic Problem
For one reason or another, people choose to bunch their work and leisure together in time.
For example, workers typically work for 8 hours or so and separate the 8-hour work sessions with
16-hour intervals of "leisure" or nonwork time. Many workers also work five days in a row and
separate these five day sessions with two day "weekends". Several consecutive weeks of work are
separated by three or more day "vacations" and several consecutive years of work are separated by
months or years of "unemployment," "housework," or "retirement".
Is this bunching of work in time what is meant by "indivisible" labor? If so (and Hansen
(1 985) suggests this on p. 312), under what conditions do the models (P2) and (P2)' faithfully
describe that bunching? I begin with a continuous time labor supply model with a fixed cost of
7Ben-Porath (1973, p. 700) also points out that it is a quantitative question whether or not
the divisible model faithfully describes labor force participation decisions, but he focuses on the
serial correlation of tastes and not other relevant quantitative issues such as the quality of
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beginning a "work session" and, following Chapman (1909), "fatigue" effects on productivity or
utility. In a special case, the model is equivalent to (P2)'. In other cases, (P2)' does not faithfully
describe the optimal bunching of work while the model of optimal bunching may have implications
for macro data that cannot be derived from a LR model. Hence, a look at the microfoundations of
indivisible labor does generate some macro implications which cannot be derived from a divisible
model.
Static models of fixed costs and indivisible labor have previously been developed (eg., Barzel
1973, Killingsworth 1983, Cogan 1980, 1981). Whether or not the "fixed cost" is a time or a goods
cost matters in the static models and matters much the same way in a dynamic model. However,
preferences, wealth, and overall labor productivity are important determinants of the degree to which
labor is "indivisible" in the static models. This is not true in a dynamic model with employment
lotteries, where the possibilities of substitution over time or trade in lotteries effectively eliminate the
nonconvex portions of the "static budget set." As a result, the labor indivisibility depends only on
the magnitude of the fixed cost, whether the cost is a time or goods cost, and the way in which
productivity and flows of utility depend on the history of labor supply. The dynamic formulation also
emphasizes that the equilibrium amount of bunching of labor during one interval of time depends on
the preferences and opportunities for work at other points in time.
I derive "indivisible labor" from a tradeoff between fixed costs and fatigue effects, but others
(eg., Killingsworth 1983, Weiss 1996, Haniermesh 1997) have suggested that the synchronization of
work schedules, rather than fixed costs and fatigue effects, can result in "indivisible labor". I do not
explore this possibility and am unaware of a proof in the literature that synchronization is a sufficient
condition for work or leisure to be bunched in time.
IVB. Is One Lfetirne Work Session Optimal?
Assume that, in order for work at a point in time to be productive, it must be preceded by
either work or the payment of a startup cost. Let a "work session" be an time interval during which
only work occurs. In a model with intertemporally separable preferences and constant growth wage
and preference profiles, a worker facing such a startup cost would have only one work session in his
life -nobreak-time, no weekends, no vacations, etc. -sothat he would avoid multiple payments of
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of that session would depend on interest rates, time preference, and the shape of the wage profile, but
there would be only one work session. With nonmonotonic wage and preference profiles (eg., a
child-rearing period), there may be multiple work sessions but there would still be the incentive to
bunch work together in long blocks.
IV.C. A Model of Stock Effects
To avoid this rather unrealistic implication, I also suppose that tastes or the marginal product
of labor fail to be intertemporally separable at very high frequencies. Suppose, for example, that
workers get tired and their productivity falls after several consecutive hours of work. Then it will still
be optimal to bunch work in order to economize on the fixed cost, but optimal work plans will
involve many relatively short work sessions.
To see the economics of this, consider a continuous time model. As before, I indexes time
but now also takes on noninteger values. Each integer time t is the begiiming of a potential work
session. If the session indexed by an integer I is worked, then time during interval {t,t±f] is spent
setting up the work session (but not producing), time in the interval [1±f,t+T,I is spent working (and
producing), and time in the interval [t+T,,t+lJ is spent on leisure. Inclusive of the startup timef, 7
is work time for the time interval indexed by an integer t.
All work sessions must be immediately preceded by some startup time in the amountf8 If
we interpret this model at a high frequency, f might be thought of as commuting time and a 'work
session" would be a day at the office or factory, Orf might be "Monday meetings" followed by a
four days of work. Or, for seasonal workers,f might be "locating a job" followed by a seasonal work
session.
Work productivity y(t) at point in time I depends on the history of time use up to that point:
y(t) =AIlt(t)[
1 —G(tmod 1)],tmod 1T,
(4)
G(s)F 0, 1],G"(s) ￿ 0 ,Gs(s) ￿ 0
8Hansen (1985) describes this setup time as "warm up time," "driving a long distance to
work," or "enduring the hassle of putting on a suit and tie" (p. 312). It does not matter whether
there is a setup cost of working (so thatf is paid at the beginning of a session) or a setup cost of
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where int(t) denotes the largest integer less than or equal to tand(tmod1) is (t-int(t)). The
productivity parameter Aflt(,) is a constant within work sessions, but can vary across work sessions.
F
Totallabor product for the work session indexed by the integer tisIc y(t+s)ds.I allow
discounting within work sessions but, for simplicity, assume that it is at the rate of time preference
p. Notice that, since U' ￿0,the "margin product" y(T,) falls (or at least does not increase) as we
increase 7 fromf to 1 while "average product" (session product per unit time) increases and then falls
with T.
Since G' ￿0,instantaneous productivity y(t) is relatively high early in the work session and
falls with time. Hence, G can be interpreted as the "fatigue" that occurs with extended intervals of
work. This fatigue is much like that modeled by Chapman (1909) and, without fixed costs, by
Kydland and Prescott (1982), Hotz et al (1988). The only substantial difference is my assumption
that fatigue depends on work history only since the last integer tratherthan on the entire work
history (including work histories from prior work sessions).9 Fatigue can be interpreted literally, or
as the deterioriation of working conditions with time worked (eg., one's office gets messy), or as the
deterioration of market conditions with time worked (eg., a salesman exhausting his prospects as he
makes his sales calls), or as progressive taxation by the government of session product.
It is relevant thatf is a time cost rather than a goods cost. I do not explicitly introduce goods
costs into the model, but similar results can be obtained by assuming a negative correlation between
[and A (t)acrosswork sessions. An example of a goods setup cost might be the acquisition of a
wardrobe or other equipment for the job, although a strict adherence with the model requires that the
usefulness of these items terminate when a work session terminates.
I do not explicitly model time-of-day, time-of-year, meteorological, and other naturally
recurring effects on labor productivity but the fatigue factor (4) can include them. For example, an
outdoor construction worker's productivity might be low at the marginal time of day because of poor
natural lighting or low at the marginal time of year because of poor weather conditions. However,
9Kydland and Prescott (1983) also assume that fatigue enters the utility function rather
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"naturally cycling" productivity is mt enough to explain why five day work sessions are followed by
two-day weekends or why factory workers' daily work hours are more sensitive to economic
conditions than to, say, annual cycles in the times that the sun rises and sets. Nor is it clear that the
economics of labor supply under naturally cycling productivity is so different from other stock effects
that they must be analyzed separately.
The fatigue factor represented by the integral in equation (4) can also represent "progressive"
labor income taxes which are levied on time-aggregated labor income ("progressive" in the sense that
marginal tax rates rise with time-aggregated labor income). In this case, a slightly longer work
session increases after-tax earnings by less than session average after-tax earnings because the
marginal tax rate is rising.
IVD. Continuous Time Preferences for Leisure
Workers/consumers get utility from leisure, but not from work or setting up a work session.





As before, consumption and leisure are separable. What is new in equation (5) is that leisure at any
instant in time must be either 0 or 1 ((5) does not rule out fractional amounts of leisure during a time
interval). This rules out variation in the intensity of effort devoted to leisure or work at any instant
in time -apossibility which may itself have macro implications.
Assume that y(t) = sothat the marginal utility of leisure is constant within work sessions.
Henceforth, subscripts are understood to index work sessions, taking only integer values I =1,2, 3,
IV.E. Lotteries and Consumption Insurance in the Bunching Model
The labor supply decision might be formulated as a choice of which sessions to work and howFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -23
long each will last. As in the "indivisible" environment of Section II, such a formulation might
involve keeping track of the effect of each period's labor supply decision on the marginal utility of
wealth. As in Section II, this complication might be avoided by assuming a linear consumption value
function. I bypass that rather straightforward analysis and instead introduce lotteries and tastes
insurance into the optimal bunching model.
Consumers choose a sequence of lotteries {L,} offered by employers. The date t lottery is:
(1) an "allowance" w,, (2) a probability of working it,,and(3) a length of a work session T,.
Consumers receive their allowance at the beginning of the period regardless of the outcome of the
lottery. If a consumer is chosen to work, he works for 7 units of time (including the fixed costj),
and the firm has property rights over the output which accrues according to (4). The market for
lotteries is competitive, so the only lotteries that will be traded are those satisfying:
TI
= t,AfeP[l —G(s)]ds
Problem (P3)'describes optimal labor supply decisions, allowing for a nonlinear consumption
value function:
(P3)' Optimal Bunching in Continuous-time
nrnxU(C) — it,y,fe1ds C 7; 11
o
s.t. it,[0, 1],C = a + P(F) +e ' Q, ,
T1 e {0,[tl]} ,i = rc,A1 fe_1JI 1 — G(s)] ds
There are a continuum of individuals according to their life cycle profile of tastes IF' =Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -24
{ asdescribed by assumption (A4). Differences in preferences across consumers can lead
to differences in the marginal utility of wealth U(C)evenif each consumer began life with the same
resources because some consumers are unlucky enough to dislike work during those periods when
it happens to be most productive. Heterogeneity in the marginal utility of wealth is interesting but
not necessarily related to the "indivisibility" of labor so I assume that, at date zero, consumers are ex
ante identical and trade actuarially fair "tastes" insurance contracts according to (A7):
(A7) Before their lifetime preferences F {y,y2,...,y1} are revealed, (P3)' consumers choose the
insurance contract P(F) that has expected value zero and maximizes the expected value of the
problem (P3)'. Ex ante, each consumer has the same probability of drawing any particular preference
profile.
After insurance contracts are settled, consumers choose their demand for employment lotteries
according to (P3)'.
It will be useful to define a "parameterization" of(P3)' to be (a,pf{A1,g,,Q,})R3xL31'.
IV.F. Optimal Session Length
When the length of each session is chosen optimally, the marginal product of each session is
equated across sessions worked up to the taste parameter:
QA1[1-G(T1)]QA[1 -G(T)] ______________=
,allt,sIt1ts > 0 (6)
Yt Ys
Itis easy to show that high QA/y1sessionsare worked longer, with the relationship between Q4f/,
and Tdeterminedby the shape of the intrasession marginal productivity function G(s).
IV. G. MinimumSession Length
Assumingthat the utility from leisure is parameterized in a realistic way,'° it is not optimal to
'°If the preference for leisure is very weak, consumers may work continuously for nearly
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have only one lifetime work session. A very short work session has low average productivity but high
marginal productivity. Rather than working such short sessions, it pays to fewer longer sessions in
order to incur the fixed costs [less often. It also pays for workers working such short sessions to
trade in lotteries so that all enjoy some earnings but only a fraction of them work and incur the fixed
cost. Hence, the possibility of substitution over time or trade in lotteries means the "marginal
product" of any session worked should be no larger than the "average product" of the next best
session to be worked. This implies a minimum length of a work session definedaccording to
the equation of the average and marginal products of a session:"
n
P fe Ps{l - G(s)]ds =.I-G(T1)
1-e (7)
No session that is worked will be worked for less than T11. Furthermore, Tm,, depends only
on the intrasession discount rate, the fixed cost, and the shape of the intrasession marginal
productivity function G(s); Turn does not depend on wages, intersession discount rates, or preferences.
IV. H Equivalence of the Bunching and Indivisible Models
Propositions 7 and 8 show how the optimal bunching of labor in continuous time can be
interpreted as a discrete time indivisible labor model. Conversely, the discrete time indivisible labor
models of Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988) and others can be interpreted as the reduced form of a
problem describing the optimal bunching of labor in continuous time in the presence of fixed costs
and fatigue effects.
Proposition 7 If G(s) takes the form (8), then for every parameterization of the problem (P2)' there
work for only one session.
"For simplicity, it is assumed that theimplicitly defined by (7) is less than one. If not,
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exists a parameterization of the Problem (P3)' that yields the same sequence of individual hours and
wages, where{n1,w,} are computed from (P3)' according to (9). The parameters (a,p,{gQ })are
indentical for the two problems. As functions of the parameters of(P2)', the other parameters (f(A,})
for the problem (P3)' are any element of RxR1 satisfying (10).
0if s ￿ Lln-E (f 1)
G(s) = 1' (8)
1if s>—ln-
pI-pn
1 _ePT(WE__ (9) p nrC,
1 —e w,EA,1 — — (10)
pn
Proof (i) Choose any set of parameters (a,p,n,{w,,g,Q,}) R2xR31 for the problem (P2)'
(ii) For any positive f,letthe parameters for the problem (P3)' be (a,p,f,{A(,g,,Q,}), with {A,}
computed from (10).
(iii) 'When G(s) takes the form (8), we have 7', =Lln'-fora session Ithatis worked.
p1-pn
(iv)Rewriting the problem (P3)' using the transformation of variables (9), we have the problem (P2)'.
The Proposition derives Hansen's (1985) environment as a reduced form of the optimal
bunching problem when the fatigue function G(s) takes the special form (8).12Herethere is no
12Under one interpretation, Kydland and Prescott (1991) also build a bunching model that
has Hansen (1985) as its reduced form. They do not explicitly model "fatigue" and the bunching
of labor in continuous time, but their discontinuous utility function defined over "employment"
and "hours" can be interpreted as a bunching model where fatigue affects the disutility of work
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fatigue early in the work session and complete fatigue later in the session. The discrete transition
from zero to complete fatigue means that all session worked are the same length regardless of wages,
tastes, and other variables. If G(s) declined continuously with s, then we see from equation (6) that
the length of a work session would vary with wages and other variables.
The proof of Proposition 7 reveals that there are many parameterizations of (P3) that
generate the same data on aggregate hours and earnings as a single parameterization of (P2)'. Indeed,
there are equivalent parameterizations of (P3)' not exhibited in Proposition 7. An important reason
for multiple equivalent pararneterizations of (P3)' is that, without any variation in hours across
sessions or across persons, it is impossible to distinguish a session with high productivity A, and a high
fixed cost[ from a session with low productivity A, and a low fixed cost Ibecauseboth could involve
the same hours and output. Nor is it possible to distinguish a high intrasession discount rate from a
high marginal disutility of work because each could generate the same reservation wage.
Proposition 8 If G(s) takes the form (8), then for every parameterization of the problem (P3)' there
exists a parameterization of the Problem (P2)' that yields the same sequence of individual hours and
earnings where n and {kTvk} arecomputed from (P3)' according to (9). The parameters
(a,p, {g,, Q,})areidentical for the two problems. As functions of the parameters of (P3)', the other
parameters {w,} for the problem (P2)' are computed according to (10).
Proof (i) Choose any set of parameters (a,p,f,{A,,g,,Q,}) c R3xR3'' for the problem (P3)'.
(ii) Let the parameters for the problem (P2)' be (a,p,n,{w,,ng,,Q,}), with {w,} computed from (10).
(iii) When G(s) takes the form (8), we have i', =ln-fora session tthatis worked.
p I—pn
(iv)Rewriting the problem (P3)' using the transformation of variables (9), we have the
parameterization of the problem (P2)' specified in (ii) above.
Propositions 7 and 8 show how the optimal bunching of labor in continuous time can be
interpreted as a discrete time indivisible labor model. Conversely, the discrete time indivisible labor
models of Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988) and others can be interpreted as the reduced form of a
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and fatigue effects.
V. "Intensive Margins" in the Indivisible Model
Following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), my divisible and indivisible macro models
have been designed to generate macro data on hours and earnings. But the models might be modified
to generate macro data on hours, employment rates, and earnings. Are the two approaches still
observationally equivalent? This section shows that the answer depends on the micro model of the
"extensive" and "intensive" margins.
V.A. "Intensive" and "Extensive" Margins in the Divisible Economy
Hanoch (1980), Kydland and Prescott (1991), Cho and Cooley (1994), and others have built
both "extensive" and "intensive" margins into models of aggregate labor supply. The marginal
disutility of work depends separately on the employment rate II and hours conditional on employment




Q1w,H1 n1 ,ii, = A1W(H/fl()
Notice that the wage rate is allowed to depend on the quantity of labor supplied. The only other
difference between (P1)' and (P1)" is that (P1)" makes predictions for the decomposition of each
date's aggregate hoursinto an employment rate H, and hours conditional on employment n,. In
particular, optimal II, and n, are time-invariant functions of N.
As with my other divisible models, I interpret (P 1)' as an aggregation across persons. Hanoch
(1980) considers (P1)" with T 1 and interprets it as a time-aggregated model of individual-levelFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -29
decisions. In his interpretation, H, is the fraction of the 52 weeks in year I during which some work
occurs and n, is average hours worked during those weeks.
V.11. Intensive Margins in the Optimal Bunching Problem
Without assuming the functional form (8), the optimal bunching problem (P3)' is a micro
model of both extensive and intensive margins of labor supply. Whether or not a session is worked
as well as the length of time worked conditional on working vary over time and across people. And,
since session length varies over time and across people, so does average hourly earnings.'3 Let n, and




n, =fG'(1 -e'[l _G(T11)])dx
H, (11)
E(ll,)
n1H1 =fG' (i -eF'(ll,)[1 -G(11,)])f(x)dx E (H1)
As before, II, denotes the fraction working at date I. The density of those with preferences y, =g,et
is, among those working, f(x)/H,. The G' in the two integrals is, among those working, the time
worked by those with preferences y, =g,e'.
As in the divisible model (P1)", the employment rate ll and average hours of those employed
n, are time-invariant functions of aggregate hours N,. When normalized by the labor productivity
parameter A,, hourly earnings averaged across workers w,IA, are also a time invariant function w(Aç)
of aggregate hours in both models. That function is computed below for the optimal bunching model:
13Because of the lotteries and consumption insurance, optimal lifetime consumption C
does not vary across individuals.Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -30
=A1w(N1)
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Thus the optimal bunching model is a special case of the divisible model (P1) because the same
forces (namely the functions F and G) determining the relationship between employment 1] and hours
n, also determine the relationship between hours and "wages". In this sense,the indivisibility of labor
has refutable macro implications that cannot be derived from the divisible model (P1 )'.
The expressions (7), (1 1) and (12) also show that the optimal bunching model has implications
for the relationship between fixed costsf, intrasession discount rates r, employment rates, aggregate
hours, and aggregate earnings.
V.C. Intensive Margins as a Consequence qf Time Aggregation
Labor supply is almost always measured as a time aggregate: the total time worked during
a particular time interval such as a day, week, or year. My Sections II and III follow the previous
literature and presume that the time interval over which labor is indivisible coincides with the interval
of time aggregation. That is, if labor supply is measured by calendar month, then the calendar month
is the time interval during which labor supply must be either 0 or n. By relaxing that assumption,
then the models (P2) and (P2)' can generate time-aggregated macro data that appears to have
"intensive" and "extensive" margins.
Let the "measurement period" be an aggregate of K periods (or "potential work sessions")
in the model (P2) or (P2)'. Work sessions are indexed t =1,...,TKand measurement periods] =1,
T. Thus]I denotes an aggregate of sessions t =1,..., K;j =2denotes an aggregate of sessions
t =K+1,...,2K,etc. As an example, if the potential work session were a month and adult life span
equal to 50 years, then K =12and T =50would model the Census' Bureau's annual measures of
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A person is said to be "employed" during measurement periodj if positive hours are worked
during any of the sessions t= (/-1)K+1,...,jK. Since n1 E{O,n/K}fort =1,...,TK,an individual's
measured labor supply must be from the set {O, k/K, 2k/K, 3 n/K, ...,}. ' Assumingthat the wage
rate Q,w1, the degree of indivisibility i/K, and the geometric average marginal disutility of work g,






Asin the time disaggregated model, aggregate hours measured for period! are:
N. =F(ln I g,)
Thistime aggregation of (P2)' produces a special case of the divisible model (P1)". In
particular, it is the special case with w(N) =1and utility function:
v(H,n) =ln(_L)
+lim!
1 -(1 _x)Kdx (13) k:OX1 —(1 —x)1 —x/K
with i)amonotone increasing function (a transformation of the disutility of work function v from
(P2)'). Mulligan (1998a) uses this model to explain life cycle labor supply, suggesting that, when the
measurement period is a year, K =2fits the life cycle date best. He does not offer a test of the
restriction (13).
This analysis shows that Mulligan's (1998a) interpretation of the "hours" margin is
'4To facilitate the comparison with the time-disaggregated models, the degree of
indivisibility is expressed in units such that the maximum labor supply during the measurement
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substantially different that Ben-Porath's (1973) or Heckman's (1978, 1993). Ben-Porath and
Heckman insist that the "hours" and "employment" margins are economically very different while
Mulligan suggests that all labor supply decisions are on the extensive margin and that the distinction
between employment and hours is only one of time aggregation.
Cho and Cooley motivate their v(H,n) as a reduced form of a time aggregation problem. In
fact, their model can be thought of as the time aggregation (as described above) of my optimal
bunching model, although they only consider the special case where preferences are homogeneous
within the interval of time being aggregated and where K =. Ofcourse, their (p. 241) finding of
a highly wage-elastic employment rate (as well as Kydland and Prescott's (1991)) is a consequence
of their homogeneity assumption; the employment rate could be inelastic in their model with enough
heterogeneity.
VD. Heterogeneous Fatigue Effects
A fourth way of modifying the indivisible model to generate "extensive" and "intensive"
margins is to allow agents to differ in the degree of indivisibility .Letagent i's date t marginal
disutility of work be (this replaces the terms y in the objective of (P2)'):
gg(n')v(n')e
whereis a time-specific preference parameter common to all agents, the function g(n')modelsthe
possibility that agents may have systematically different preferences according to their degree of
indivisibility, c,' is an agent and time specific preference parameter which is distribution according to
the function F, and v(n) reflects variation in the disutility of work with the amount worked (v'>O,
v">O).
Let the date zero "tastes insurance" also insure heterogeneity in the "fatigue effect" parameter
so the marginal utility of wealth ? is the same for all agents. Agent i works at date tif and only
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￿ in — - in[g(n )v(n)]in —- in1(n')
g,
where A,w(n') is agent i's date thourlyearnings.
Aggregating across agents, we can compute total hours A', the employment rate fi,, and hours
for those employed n,. As in the divisibie model (P1 )",H,and n, are time-invariant functions of A7.
Infact, for any parameterization of(P1)", there exists distributions of tastes (F and r) and a wage
function w(n) such that the model of heterogeneous fatigue effects generates the same macro data
{ll,,n,,w,}. Similarly, for any distributions of tastes (F and r) and wage function w(n), there exists
a utility function v(ll,n) and parameters for the problem (P1)" generating the same macrodata
{111,n,,w,}
.
VI.Time-Aggregated Nonlinear Tax Rules
An important reason for the macro equivalence between the divisible and indivisible models
of labor supply above is the economic insignificance the interval of time measurement. In fact, the
Census Bureau, Survey Research Center, and others ask workers about their work hours aggregated
over a week, month, or year because those intervals coincide with some of the bunchingof economic
activity and, as a consequence, survey respondents can be expected to more accurately remember
their activity over those intervals than over some arbitrarily chosen interval. For example, one reason
that a calendar month or calendar year might be economically significant is because these intervals
coincide with federal government time aggregation rules for computing taxes and transfers.
For simplicity, I assume that the government accounting period (a "year") is equal to the
interval between work sessions, 1. Period tlaborincome taxes are a function t,(e,) of accounting
period earnings Cfand,for simplicity, it is assumed that t,'(e,) exists for all nonnegative e,. When the
indivisible model (P2)' is modified to include these tax rules and aggregated according to (A4) and
(A6), aggregate hours for year taredescribed by equation (13):
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where ATR, is the year Iaveragetax rate. Notice that, although workers are different, they all make
decisions based on the same two points in the tax schedule: t,'(nw,) and t,'(O).
When the divisible model (P1)' is modified to include these tax rules and the marginal disutility






where MTR1 is the year tmarginaltax rate.
Thus average tax rates determine labor supply in the indivisible model while marginal tax
rates determine labor supply (or at least its allocation over time) in the divisible model. Equations
(13) and (14) are interesting not only because they expose a difference between thedivisible and
indivisible models, but are of significant relevance for public finance. First, it has been extensively
argued (eg., Hall and Rabushka 1995) that a revenue neutral fiat tax would dramaticallyincrease the
efficiency of taxpayers' time allocations. But, of course, this analysis relies heavily onthe
presumption that -holdingconstant tax revenue -laborsupply depends on the marginal tax rate. My
analysis shows that only the average tax rate matters in a model of indivisible laborwhen the
'indivisibility" is at least as long as the tax accounting period. Second, the distinction between
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average and marginal taxes rates matters for theestimation of labor supply elasticities (which are used
for, among other things, tax reform simulations). As shown above for the indivisible model,the
observations of MaCurdy (1992) and others that micro or macro labor supply is unresponsive to
marginal tax rates is quite consistent with large aggregate labor supply elasticities. Hoynes (1996),
Leibman and Eissa (1996), and Mulligan (1998a) study applications of this result, suggesting that
average rather than marginal tax rates explain labor supply.
Another difference between the divisible and indivisible labor models is that, in a population
of heterogeneous individuals facing the same labor income tax schedule, the former predicts that the
distribution of a year tsessionsearnings has mass points at any "kink" in the tax schedule. This is not
true in the indivisible labor model where the distribution of nonzero earnings follows the distribution
of w,n unless the degree of indivisibility n itself responds to tax incentives. This distribution will not
typically have mass point unless the underling distributions of tastes or pretax wageshave a mass
point. Thus the findings of Hausman (1986) and others that the incomedistribution does not seem
to be concentrated at kinks in the individual income tax schedule is consistent with large wage
elasticities of labor supply.
Results are more complicated when the tax accounting period is different from the interval
between work sessions or the function t('(e,) is discontinuous, but it is still true that the indivisible
labor model has implications that are distinct from the divisible model.
VII. Conclusions
I build a micro model of the bunching of work and leisure in time. The optimal length of the
work session is determined by a tradeoff between session fixed costs and stock effects on productivity
or utility. Higher productivity sessions are worked longer and allsessions worked are worked for
at least some minimum length of time. The minimum depends on the magnitude of the fixed cost,the
form of the stock effects, and the intrasession discount rate, but not worker wealth, wages, or tastes.
For a particular form of the stock effects, all sessions are worked the same length of time and
optimal labor supply can be described in reduced form by the "indivisible labor"models Diamond and
Mirrlees (1978, 1986), Hansen (1985), Hamilton (1988), Rogerson (1988), Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) and many others. When aggregated across individuals (and perhaps over time),
the indivisible model is equivalent to the divisible model of Lucas and Rapping (1969) defined overFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor -36
aggregated measures.
Thus, I argue that labor indivisibility (as modeled by these authors) per sehas no implications
for macroeconomics. Although such an aggregation result may notbe particularly surprising -for
example, Marshall suggests this in his Principles of Economics (1920/1990)and Hamermesh (1990)
derives a smooth labor demand function in a micro model of lumpy adjustmentcosts -Iam able to
be precise about the mapping between the heterogeneity and thesmoothness of well known models
of aggregate behavior. My proofs also show how Hansen's (1985)and Rogerson's (1988) findings
of an infinite equilibrium aggregate labor supply elasticity are not a consequenceof indivisibility, but
of (a) the homogeneity of micro-level decisions, and (b) theirdefinition of equilibrium. My
Propositions contradict Rogerson's (1988, pp. 3, 14)claims that indivisibility implies large aggregate
labor supply elasticities even when agents are heterogeneous in termsof their reservation wages. Nor
is it true that substitution along the "extensive" margin must be greaterthan substitution along the
"intensive" margin. Rogerson (1988, p. 14) defends his claimswith a parametric example. but my
Propositions 2 and 4 show the importance of his assuming a particulardistribution for the
"reservation wage."7 Indeed, any nonnegative aggregate labor supply elasticity canbe generated by
either a divisible or an indivisible model.
I introduce two other models of indivisible labor that do have macro implications.The first
is a model of the optimal bunching of work over time in which the lengthof a work session optimally
varies over time and across agents. Because of the fixed costs and fatigueeffects that determine the
optimal bunching, the model places a restriction on the comovementsof employment rates, aggregate
hours, and aggregate earnings that are not obtainedfrom a divisible representative agent model of
employment and hours. In particular, average hourly earningsendogenously vary over time and in
a way that is related to the comovementsof employment and hours. However, this restriction is
rather subtle and, to my knowledge, has not to date been the subjectof empirical testing. It cannot
be shown that, as a consequence of the endogeneity of average hourly earnings,whether the elasticity
of aggregate labor supply with respect to average hourly earningsis necessarily larger (or necessarily
smaller) in the indivisible than in the divisible model.
The second model time-aggregates individual-level choices on the"extensive" margin to
'7Defining the "reservation wage" to be the lowest wage atwhich the constraint 7c1￿ 0
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obtain individual-level measures of "employment" and "hours." The model restricts the comovements
of employment rates and aggregate hours, but again this restriction is rather subtle and not the subject
of empirical testing to date.
Related, but different, aggregation results can be found in the production theory literature.
For example, Hamermesh (1990) studies a model of discrete micro-level labor demand adjustments
which look smooth at the aggregate level. Houthakker's (1955) proof -thatthe input demands of
heterogeneous Leontief firms can aggregate to a smooth industry demand -isa closer and more well-
known analytical cousin to my result. Houthakker's "fixed proportion" is analogous to my labor
indivisibilitywhile each of his firm's profit is analogous to my reservation wage. Houtkakker
generates Cobb-Douglas input demand by aggregating across firms with identical profits (namely
zero) and fixed proportions distributed Pareto. I generate (in a special case) Cobb-Douglas labor
supply by aggregating across consumers with identical "fixed proportions" (n)andreservation wages
distributed exponential.
Smooth aggregate labor supply is generated from a smooth cross-sectional distribution of
reservation wages, where the reservation wage is the wage at which a worker demands a lottery with
employment probability zero. I obtain from a smooth distribution of the marginal disutility of work,
but there are other ways to generate a smooth distribution of reservation wages and hence smooth
aggregate labor supply.18 This might be achieved with heterogeneity in initial assets, heterogeneity
in the lifetime history of various shocks, a staggering of time intervals across agents (eg., agent i's
"period" begins when agent fs "period" is half completed), or heterogeneity in remaining life
expectancy. Mulligan (1998a) also shows how approximately smooth individual-level responses can
be derived when reservation wages vary over time and "labor supply" is measured as a time
aggregate. Cho's (1995) simulation results suggest that smooth labor supply in the presence of
indivisible labor might result from wage heterogeneity, although he considers only temporary
heterogeneity and does not show whether or not indivisible and divisible models can be distinguished
with aggregate data.
I refer to "macro data" in both the divisible and indivisible economies as an aggregation of
prices and quantities across individuals with identical initial wealth a, rates of time preference p,
'8Heterogeneous marginal disutility need not imply heterogeneous reservation wages (eg.,
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wages and interest factor profiles {w1,Q,}, andmarginal disutility of wealth schedules U(C).My
assumption of homogeneity in these dimensions is only for analytical simplicity. If agents differed,
say, in initial wealth a, and the distributions were the same in the divisible and indivisible economies,
then both the indivisible and divisible economies would generate the same macro data. This can be
proved by first aggregating within groups of individuals with the same a, applying the relevant
Propositions 1-4, and then aggregating across groups. What is no longer necessarily true in this case
is that (twice) aggregated prices and quantities appear as if they were generated by a representative
agent. But this paper does not claim a representative agent always exists, only that indivisible and
divisible economies are indistinguishable with macro data. Moreover, while the nonexistence of a
representative agent may introduce its own econometric problems (problems which are the basis of
criticisms of aggregate studies by Smith (1977, p. 249) and Pencavel (1986, p 34)), aggregation can
eliminate some econometric problems.'9
Labor productivity cannot be directly observed when a person is not working. Moreover, a
sample of workers is certainly a sample selected according to labor productivity. This paper does not
deny these realities. However, a number of authors in the literature have taken this fact a step further,
suggesting that studies of the "hours" margin are immune to (or at least less sensitive to) this form
of sample selectivity bias than are studies of the "employment" margin.20 Their suggestions may be
true, but cannot be derived as a matter of logic. Just as we do not know the current labor
productivity of a woman who has been out of the labor force for five years, we do not know the
summer labor productivity of a school teacher or the late-night labor productivity of a banker who
is continuously employed during normal business hours. Since the important econometric problem
of inferring labor productivity for those times when a person does not work need not be related to
the divisibility of labor or to the distinction between "employment" and "hours," I have neglected any
discussion of that issue in my analysis of indivisibility.
Time aggregation can be of economic significance, for example, when it is a part of
government tax policy. Indivisible labor therefore has important implications for public finance.
19J emphasize the benefits of aggregation of micro-level discontinuities. See Grunfeld and
Griliches (1960) for examples of potential benefits of aggregating micro-level specification errors.
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Given that measures of economic activity are typically aggregated over periods no longer than
a year, I am primarily interested in fairly high frequency bunching of work and leisure. But I suspect
that similar economic issues arise at lower frequencies, perhaps with retirement and long-term
employment or with life cycle job and occupation changes. In these cases, the "fixed cost" f might
represent time accumulating firm-specific human capital and the "work session" tenure with a firm.
orfmight represent time accumulating occupation-specific human capital and the "work session"
tenure in that occupation or industry. An interesting extension of my analysis would be to
simultaneously introduce fixed costs which are amortized over different horizons and fatigue effects
which decay at different rates.
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